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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,, 
vs. Case No. 19033 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 0. 
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for plaintiff's per-
sonal injuries occurring when a subject of an arrest fired a 
rifle at the defendant police officers and a bullet entered 
the plaintiff's nearby trailer home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the summary judgment of the 
lower court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with this court's Order of 
October 3, 1983 in that her Statement of Facts contains no 
citations to the record on appeal and thereby fails to con-
form with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather 
than controverting each of the numerous facts alleged in 
plaintiff's Statement of Facts that are totally unsupported 
by the record/ defendants submit the following Statement of 
Facts/ which is fully supported by the record. 
On February 21, 1979# shortly after midnight/ defendants 
H. L. Bradley (hereinafter "Bradley")/ Arthur 0. Stewart 
(hereinafter "Stewart") and Grant Hinchcliff (hereinafter 
"Hinchcliff")/ three officers of the Police Department of 
defendant Cedar City Corporation, were involved in a gunfight 
with Mr. Neil Anderson (hereinafter "Neil") at Kelly's 
Trailer Park in Cedar City, Utah. The gunfight resulted in 
the death of Neil. Plaintiff/ another resident of Kelly's 
Trailer Park/ received a gunshot wound in her right foot/ 
resulting in the injuries of which she complains. (R. 54, 
Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 35-37). 
Earlier, on the evening of February 20/ 1979, Neil was a 
passenger in a vehicle being driven by Eugene Anderson (here-
inafter "Eugene")/ his brother. At approximately 11:20 that 
evening, Hinchcliff and officer Bruce Marshall/ also of the 
-2-
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Cedar City Police Department, stopped the vehicle Eugene was 
driving because they suspected that he was operating the 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Upon approaching the 
Anderson vehicle, it was apparent to the officers that both 
were intoxicated. Eugene was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and both Andersons were taken to the 
Iron County jail. (R. 21, HIT 2-3). After breathalyzer tests 
were performed at the jail, Hinchcliff contacted Neil's wife, 
Sharlene Anderson (hereinafter "Sharlene"), and requested 
that she come to the jail and transport Neil to the Anderson 
home (the car was impounded as neither Eugene nor Neil were 
fit to drive). When Sharlene arrived, she protested taking 
her husband home because in her opinion he could be argumen-
tative and make trouble when intoxicated. Nevertheless, 
because Neil was controllable and cooperative, he was 
released to his wife's custody and was taken home. (R. 21, 
HIT 4-5; R. 29, Iff 2-4). 
When Neil arrived at home, he began making threats about 
getting his gun and returning to the jail to obtain his 
brother's release by force. Sharlene, alarmed by her hus-
band's conduct, telephoned the Cedar City Police Department 
offices and notified the person answering that her husband 
was being very abusive and threatening force with his gun. 
(R. 21, H 6; R. 22, 1T 2; R. 23, IT 2; R. 29, If 4). 
-3-
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Bradley, Stewart and Hinchcliff responded to Sharlene's 
call and traveled to the trailer park in two separate patrol 
cars. When they arrived at the Anderson trailer, Bradley 
observed Neil inside with a rifle in his hand. Sharlene 
believes that Bradley could have disarmed Neil in the 
trailer. (R. 29, 1F 4). However, Bradley states that when he 
approached the trailer, Neil had the rifle in his hands and 
there was no opportunity to disarm him. (R. 22, UU 5-6). It 
is undisputed that at some time all the officers retreated 
and Neil stepped onto the porch with the rifle. Despite the 
efforts of the three officers, and Sharlene, to assure Neil 
that Eugene was being released from jail, Neil would not put 
the gun down. (R. 21, HIT 7, 9-11; R. 22, HIT 3-5, 7-8; R. 23, 
ITU 3-5, 7-8; R. 29, f 4). 
Plaintiff's trailer was located across the street west of 
the Anderson trailer and was situated such that the south 
half of it was in a direct line with the porch where Neil was 
standing. Stewart took a position in a small grassy area 
slightly northwest of the porch where Neil was standing and 
due east of plaintiff's trailer. Hinchcliff took cover in 
the street behind a pickup truck northwest of the Anderson 
trailer and Bradley took cover behind the northwest corner of 
the Anderson trailer. (R. 21, HIT 8-10, 12 & attached dia-
gram; R. 22, 1M 3, 5, 7; R. 23, 11T 3-5, 1, 10). 
-4-
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While pointing the rifle in Stewart's direction, Neil 
fired the rifle and Stewart heard the bullet pass him to the 
right, heading directly toward plaintiff's trailer. All 
three officers returned fire, striking Neil, who collapsed, 
firing one more round that struck a Chevrolet parked in the 
Anderson driveway. Stewart and the other officers were at 
all times standing with their backs to plaintiff's trailer 
during the exchange of gunfire. (R. 21, 1J1F 12-15, 17; R. 22, 
U1F 10-12, 14; R. 23, 1111 10-12, 15). Indeed, plaintiff admits 
in her deposition that the bullet that entered her trailer 
and hit her came from the direction of the Anderson trailer. 
(R. 54, Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 41-44 & Exhibit 
1). There is no evidence that the bullet that injured plain-
tiff was fired by anyone other than Neil. 
ARGUMENT 
Although it is unclear from a reading of plaintiff's 
brief, she apparently maintains that there are three genuine 
issues of material fact: 
1. Whether defendants were negligent in allowing Neil 
to leave the jail in a drunken condition with full knowledge 
of his dangerous nature and propensity for violence; 
-5-
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2. Whether defendants were negligent in failing to 
respond to Sharlene's call in a professional manner by fail-
ing to disarm Neil and confronting him, resulting in the 
exchange of gunfire; and 
3. Whether defendants' acts should be legally pro-
tected. 
The third issue is clearly a question of law answered in 
the affirmative by the lower court. It is, of course, one of 
the ultimate legal issues to be decided by this court. 
Neither the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley nor the deposi-
tion of plaintiff, the only evidence presented to counter 
2 
defendants' affidavits, raise any genuine issue as to 
whether defendants were negligent. Indeed, even when the 
1
 Plaintiff has apparently abandoned her previous 
claim that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire in 
the trailer park. 
2 Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Patrick H. 
Fenton and Jay Jenson at the time of the original hearing on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 28, 30). The affidavit 
of Patrick H. Fenton merely contained the opinions, interpre-
tations and conclusions of counsel regarding the affidavits 
of Hinchcliff, Bradley and Stewart, a function that is the 
province of the court. The affidavit of Jay Jenson expressed 
an opinion concerning the bullet that entered plaintiff's 
trailer, which opinion was wholly without foundation. Both 
affidavits would be inadmissible as evidence. Therefore, 
both affidavits were properly stricken by the lower court 
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973). See also Go Real Estate Co. v. 
Smyth, No. 19057 (Utah November 4, 1983). 
6 
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facts are viewed entirely in plaintiff's favor and even if 
defendants were shown to be negligent in some respect, such 
facts are immaterial because defendants had no special duty 
to protect plaintiff and her claims are barred by the provi-
sions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 
The affidavits submitted by both parties, and any other 
facts presently in the record, establish that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants 
were negligent. 
In general, this court has defined negligence as "the 
failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances, or doing what such person under 
such circumstances would not have done." Meese v. Brigham 
Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). Accord, 
Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1001 (1966). 
An application of the definition of negligence to the 
circumstances indicates that there is no issue as to whether 
defendants were negligent; they clearly were not. While 
plaintiff claims that defendants negligently released Neil, 
it is clear they had no legal basis to hold him. Neil could 
not be held for drunken driving since he was not driving, nor 
could defendants legally have held Neil simply because 
-7-
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Sharlene was concerned about what he might do, especially 
since Neil was cooperative and rational when leaving the 
jail. Having no realistic basis to detain Neil, defendants 
had no choice but to release him. Thus, under the circum-
stances of the situation, defendants could not be negligent 
for releasing Anderson. 
Plaintiff then claims that defendants were negligent in 
failing to disarm Neil and choosing instead to confront him 
in the gunfight. Assuming that Bradley or any of the other 
defendants had an opportunity to disarm Neil in the trailer, 
as suggested by the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley, there is no 
evidence that their failure to do so constituted negligence. 
Sharlene offers the unsupported opinion that Bradley could 
have disarmed Neil, yet offers no explanation as to how it 
could have been accomplished. It is clear that she is 
attempting to second-guess Bradley's decision. Bradley had 
no knowledge of the conditions in the trailer. Under the 
circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for Bradley or 
the other defendants to risk their lives and the lives of 
others, perhaps children, to attempt to disarm Neil and con-
front him in the confined trailer. Surely, defendants cannot 
be negligent in failing, by some undisclosed method, to dis-
arm Anderson under the circumstances at the time. 
-8-
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Furthermore, what choice did defendants have once Neil 
came onto the porch with a rifle pointed at them? No reason-
able person would expect them to request Neil to go to a 
secluded field to wield his gun and shoot at defendants. 
Under the circumstances, defendants had no choice but to con-
front Anderson in the trailer park. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS OWED PLAINTIFF NO INDIVIDUAL 
DUTY TO PROTECT HER FROM HARM 
Even assuming that defendants were negligent in some 
respect, such negligence is not material because without the 
breach of legally recognized duty, there can be no recovery. 
"Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.n 
F. Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 1929). 
Defendants do not deny that the police have a general 
duty to protect the health, lives and morals of the public. 
However, a city or its police have no duty to an individual 
for injuries directly resulting from the criminal acts of a 
third person, even if the city or its police somehow breached 
the general duty to protect the safety of the public. In 
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), plain-
tiff filed suit against the Cache County Sheriff and his 
deputy seeking damages and the officers1 removal from office 
for their alleged willful and wanton failure to investigate a 
burglary of the plaintiff's store. Upon defendants1 motion, 
-9-
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the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, this 
court affirmed the dismissal. Citing Massengill v. Yuma 
County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), this court wrote: 
[W]e believe that defendants1 contention that fail-
ure by a public sheriff to investigate a crime 
claimed by an individual to have been committed, 
ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion, 
not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by 
an individual since the public officialfs duty is to 
the public, - he being accountable to and removable 
in a proper proceeding, by the public. 
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (footnotes 
omitted). 
In Massengill, a deputy sheriff failed to apprehend and 
arrest two speeding, intoxicated drivers before they were 
involved in an accident resulting in the death of plaintiffs' 
decedent. The trial court dismissed the action by plaintiffs 
against the County and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased as an 
individual. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 
P.2d 376, 381 (1969). The Arizona court further stated that 
the duty imposed upon a police officer was a duty to the pub-
lic in general and not to any particular person. Accord-
ingly, the failure to adequately discharge a police officer's 
function would result in a public rather than a private 
injury, with recourse being had, if at all, through public 
prosecution rather than through a civil action for damages. 
Id., 456 P.2d at 379. 
-10-
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Another case supporting the Obray rule is Keane v. City 
of Chicago, 98 111. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968). 
There, the trial court dismissed an action brought by the 
husband of a school teacher for failing to provide police 
protection to the teacher, who was attacked and killed by a 
student while on school premises. The Illinois Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that the duty of the city to pro-
tect the plaintiff's decedent from criminal acts was no 
greater than its "general duty to all citizens to protect the 
safety and well-being of the public at large." Ijd. at 322. 
The court also provided the following public policy support 
for its holding that there should be no recovery for breach 
of a general public duty: 
To hold that under the circumstances alleged in the 
complaint the city owed a "special duty" to Mrs. 
Keane for the safety and well-being of her person 
would impose an all but impossible burden upon the 
City, considering the numerous police, fire, housing 
and other laws, ordinances and regulations in force. 
Id. Accord, Simpson Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 
149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871, 873-76 (1971). 
The proposition that defendants owed plaintiff no special 
duty is further illustrated in Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d 
751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972). There, the police allowed an 
intoxicated motorist to drive his car away from the scene of 
an accident. The driver was involved in a second collision 
some 20 minutes later, killing another motorist. The lower 
-11-
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court entered judgment for plaintiff, who was administratrix 
of the estate of the deceased motorist. The New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, modified the judgment, holding 
that although the intoxicated driver defendant was liable, 
the defendant village was not liable for failing to arrest 
the intoxicated driver and allowing him to leave the scene of 
the first accident. The court further stated: 
It is well settled that a municipality, acting 
in its governmental capacity for the protection of 
the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a 
mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a 
particular individual to whom it has assumed no 
special duty. The Village's alleged failure to 
enforce its regulations and the Vehicle and Traffic 
Law by arresting Westerberg for intoxication, taking 
his car keys or impounding his automobile falls 
squarely within this rule of nonliability. It owed 
no special duty to Mr. and Mrs. Evers and through 
its officers, did not take any affirmative action 
which resulted in injury to a member of the public. 
Id., 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Accord, Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d 
365, 366-67 (Fla. App. 1969). 
In the instant case, plaintiff cannot demonstrate any 
special duties owed to her by defendants, aside from their 
general duty to protect the public. Indeed, the negligence, 
if any, of defendants in releasing Neil from police custody 
while he was still intoxicated, or in failing to disarm him, 
is much less culpable than that of the police in Evers, who 
released an intoxicated driver who they did have a legal 
-12-
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basis to detain and who had already been involved in one 
accident. 
In the event that plaintiff's earlier additional conten-
tion that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire 
comes before this court, there is overwhelming authority, in 
addition to the foregoing, to the effect that municipalities 
are not liable for injuries to others resulting from the ful-
fillment or breach of the general duty to apprehend wrong-
doers. See, e.g., Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530, 229 
A.2d 281, 284 (1967) (police not liable for injuries to 
bystander, caused by apprehension of fleeing motorist whose 
reckless acts are the proximate cause of the injuries); Scott 
v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 
(1956) (innocent bystander injured by gunshot wound resulting 
from police apprehension of escaped prisoner cannot recover 
from city who owed no special duty to bystander even if the 
police were negligent in permitting the escape), aff *d, 9 
N.Y.2d 764, 215 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1961). 
Based upon Obray and the ample authority from other 
jurisdictions, it is evident that even if defendants were 
somehow negligent by releasing the intoxicated Neil, in fail-
ing to disarm him, or in confronting Neil in the gunfight and 
scattering gunfire, they cannot be liable to plaintiff 
because she has not shown, and cannot show, that defendants 
breached any more than their general duty to the public. 
-13-
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Thus# although plaintiff could perhaps maintain a cause of 
action against Neil's estate for Neil's acts in initiating 
the confrontation with defendants, she has no basis for 
recovery against defendants. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
A. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Governmental Immun-
ity, 
Aside from the fact that defendants cannot be liable to 
plaintiff for any negligent breach of their general duty to 
the public, they are immune from suit under the provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which provides: "Except 
as may be otherwise provided in this Act, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function . . • ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983). 
There is no dispute that defendants were involved in a 
governmental function under the test established in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., G05 P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1980). There, this court stated the following general rule 
for determining whether an activity is a governmental func-
tion: "[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is 
whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency 
-14-
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or that it is essential to the core of governmental activ-
ity." Id. at 1236-37. 
Nothing could be more essential to the core of governmen-
tal activity than the enforcement of the laws and maintenance 
of peace and order performed by a city police department and 
its officers. Consequently, other provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act apply. The applicable section of 
the act provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of his employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or perfor-
mance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the dis-
cretion is abused . . . . 
Id., § 63-30-10(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
Assuming defendants had a choice regarding whether to 
release Neil or whether to disarm or confront him, those 
choices were discretionary functions within the meaning of 
Section 63-30-10(1)(a). Although plaintiff argues that these 
decisions were a matter of "duty", not discretion, she cites 
no legal authority in support of that contention. 
This court has applied Section 63-30-10(1)(a) to a fact 
situation analogous to the one at bar. In Epting v. State, 
546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the minor children of a murder 
victim sued the State of Utah on the theory that its 
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employees were negligent in allowing a state prison inmate to 
go on a work release program from which the prisoner left and 
murdered plaintiffs1 mother. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint and this court affirmed, holding that the prison 
officials were involved in the exercise of a discretionary 
function when they placed the prisoner on work release and 
thus were immune from suit under Section 63-30-10(1)(a). The 
court further stated that it was discretionary with prison 
officials as to whether it would be valuable and practicable 
to place a particular prisoner on the work release program. 
Id. at 243-44. See also Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 
863, 866 (D.N.J. 1982) (decision not to arrest person prior 
to his commission of bank robbery that it was known by police 
officers would be committed was a discretionary function 
under the virtually identical discretionary function exemp-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act). In the instant case, 
the decision of whether to release Neil, assuming there was 
some legal ground to hold him the first place, was also dis-
cretionary and defendants are immune from suit pursuant to 
Section 63-30-10(1)(a). 
At best, the only possible legal basis that defendants 
had for arresting and holding Neil (a basis that is only ten-
uously supported by the record) was for the offense of intox-
ication. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (Supp. 1983). However, 
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Section 76-9-701 further provides that a peace officer may at 
his discretion release an individual arrested for intoxica-
tion if he believes imprisonment would be unnecessary. Id. 
§ 76-9-701(2). Thus, even if defendants could have held Neil 
for intoxication, the very statute giving them the right to 
hold Neil provides that the decision to release him was the 
exercise of a discretionary function. 
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision not 
to disarm Neil and to otherwise confront him was also discre-
tionary. In Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 
1970), plaintiffs alleged that a decision not to confront 
political demonstrators constituted negligence and had proxi-
mately caused property damage that resulted when the demon-
stration got out of control. The lower court dismissed the 
complaint and both the Florida Court of Appeals and the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of 
whether to confront the demonstrators was discretionary, and 
that the decisionmakers were not subject to liability. The 
court stated further: 
While sovereign immunity is a salient issue 
here, we ought not lose sight of the fact that 
inherent in the right to exercise police powers is 
the right to determine strategy and tactics for the 
deployment of those powers . . . . The sovereign 
authorities ought to be left free to exercise their 
discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate 
without worry over possible allegations of negli-
gence. 
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Id. at 134. 
The rule of Wong is applicable in the instant case. The 
decision of whether to release Neil and the decision of 
whether to attempt to disarm him or confront him were deci-
sions involving judgment, tactics and strategy. The defen-
dants were confronted with a dangerous and difficult situa-
tion which they handled as well as they could, and according 
to their own best judgment. Their actions should not be 
judicially second-guessed since they clearly involve matters 
of discretion. Therefore, pursuant to Section 
63-30-10(1) (a), defendants are immune from suit and plain-
tiff's action against them should be barred. 
B. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Virtue of Her Fail-
ing to Comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In addition to providing defendants immunity from suit in 
this case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that 
plaintiff file a proper and adequate notice of claim and that 
she provide or file a bond or undertaking. Contrary to 
plaintiff's contention that these procedural requirements 
were raised by separate motion, defendants1 original Motion 
for Summary Judgment specifically states as one of its 
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the above 
requirements. Thus, since the lower court's reasons for 
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granting the summary judgment were not stated (R. 46, 47), 
plaintiff's failure to comply with these provisions could 
well have been a basis for the grant of summary judgment. 
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1975), this Court stated that "full compliance with 
[the Utah Governmental Immunity Act] requirements is a condi-
tion precedent to the right to maintain a suit." Plaintiff 
has failed to properly comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 
63-30-19 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
The 1978 version of Section 63-30-11, the version most 
likely applicable here, provides: 
Any person having a claim for injury to person or 
property against a governmental entity or its 
employee shall, before maintaining an action under 
this act, file a written notice of claim with such 
entity for appropriate relief including money dam-
ages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief 
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim 
asserted, shall be signed by the person making the 
claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian, and shall be directed and delivered 
to the responsible governmental entity within the 
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as 
applicable. 
Id., § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1981). See also Yates v. Vernal 
Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980); 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1975). 
Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a purported notice 
of claim with the Cedar City Corporation and that it was 
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filed within the prescribed time. A copy of the notice of 
claim that was filed is attached as Exhibit "F" to plain-
tiff's brief. However, that purported notice of claim did 
not comply with the essentials established in Section 
63-30-11. It merely reports facts and makes legal conclu-
sions. There is no formal demand for any kind of money dam-
ages or other relief from the city. Furthermore, the nature 
of the claim asserted is unclear. Consequently, since the 
purported notice of claim attached to plaintiff's brief is 
improper, and plaintiff failed to file a proper and timely 
notice of claim within one year after the cause of action 
arose, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (Supp. 1983), she is barred 
from maintaining this action. 
Even assuming that plaintiff has filed a proper and 
timely notice of claim in compliance with Section 63-30-11, 
she has not obtained or filed a bond as required under Sec-
tion 63-30-19. Plaintiff has evidently filed a bond pursuant 
to Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code, as required by virtue 
of her action against the three individual respondents in 
this case, but Section 63-30-19 requires an additional bond 
be filed in order for plaintiff to maintain an action against 
Cedar City Corporation. It provides: 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall 
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but 
in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned 
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upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs 
incurred by the governmental entity in the action if 
the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
to recover judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1978). Based upon Scarborough, 
appellant's failure to provide and file the bond required by 
Section 63-30-19 precludes her from pursuing this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to file a proper and timely notice 
of claim and has failed to obtain and file an appropriate 
bond as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, her action is precluded at 
the outset. But, even assuming plaintiff has met these pro-
cedural requirements, her action still fails on the merits. 
The record establishes that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. Defendants were not negligent, as a matter of 
law, since under the circumstances, they simply had no choice 
but to act as they did. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendants were negligent in 
some respect, such negligence at best amounted to only a 
breach of a general duty owed to the public at large for 
which defendants cannot be held civilly liable to plaintiff. 
Finally, pursuant to Section 63-30-10(1)(a) of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, defendants are immune from suit 
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since their alleged acts of negligence involved the perfor-
mance of a discretionary function. Consequently, plaintiff's 
action is barred. 
For the above reasons, the summary judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of November, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attotaeys for Respondents 
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